

Infection Prevention and Control Roundtable with Acute Care Facilities in Chicago

02-24-23





- Introductions: CDPH and Facility IPs
- Important Updates from CDPH
- Crossroads of acute and long-term care: what can we do to help reduce MDRO burden in healthcare
 - Candida auris Screening (Northwestern Memorial Hospital)
- Recent trends in invasive group A Streptococcal disease
- Ongoing outbreaks of significance
- Open Forum for Questions and Comments



In the chat, please share your name and facility name



- Medical Directors:
 - Dr. Do Young Kim
 - Dr. Stephanie Black
- Project Administrator: Shane Zelencik
- Project Manager: Maria Bovee
- Infection Preventionists:
 - Alison VanDine
 - Kim Goitia
 - Val Cela
- Public Health Administrator:
 - Maggie Li
- General number for our team: 312-744-1100
- <a>cdphhaiar@cityofchicago.org





Our team consists of Infection Prevention Specialists, Epidemiologists, a Project Manager, a Project Administrator, and Medical Directors who provide the following assistance:

- IP&C Guidance and training
- Infection Control Assessments and Responses (ICARs)
- Epidemiology Support
- IP&C Roundtable
- Our partnerships and site visits are meant to be educational, constructive, non-regulatory, and non-punitive
 - We work with you to resolve any identified opportunities
 - These services are not in response to citations or complaints

k In Development: Our Group on Outlook Groups

- Comprises the CDPH healthcare settings team and IPs at acute care facilities (that agreed to share contact)
- Purposes are to:
 - Disseminate information
 - Facilitate communication (will include IP contact directory)
 - Share documents
- Fill out the REDCap survey to indicate your interest in joining the group: <u>https://redcap.link/4i5jynlx</u>



🗰 Important Updates

- NHSN annual survey: Deadline: March 1st (<u>https://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/forms/instr/57_103-toi.pdf</u>)
- 2023 NHSN Virtual Training (March 21-23): This course is intended for NHSN users of the Patient Safety Component, Outpatient Procedure Component, and Neonatal Component.
 - Registration details coming soon: https://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/training/annualtraining.html
- New MMWR: Preventing Bloodstream Infections in People on Dialysis
 - Full report: <u>Vital Signs: Health Disparities in Hemodialysis-Associated Staphylococcus</u> <u>aureus Bloodstream Infections – United States, 2017–2020 | MMWR (cdc.gov)</u>
 - Adults on dialysis were 100 times more likely to have a staph bloodstream infection than adults not on dialysis during 2017–2020.



Crossroads of acute and long-term care: what can we do to help reduce MDRO burden in healthcare?

CDPH Healthcare Settings Team

- At the last roundtable, we discussed MDRO epidemiology in Chicago
- Prevalence/reporting of MDROs varies by location type:

Percentage of Chicago MDRO cases reported to XDRO by organism and reporting setting, 2022.

MDRO	Acute care hospital (ACH)	Long-term acute care hospital (LTACH)	Skilled nursing facility (SNF)	Ventilator- capable skilled nursing facility (vSNF)
C. auris	39%	42%	1%	18%
CRE	66%	14%	2%	19%
CP-CRPA*	11%	0%	0%	89%
CP-CRAB*	43%	27%	3%	27%

*Not reportable in IL

- At the last roundtable, we discussed MDRO epidemiology in Chicago
- Prevalence/reporting of MDROs varies by location type:

Percentage of Chicago MDRO cases reported to XDRO by organism and reporting setting, 2022.

MDRO	Acute care hospital (ACH)	Long-term acute care hospital (LTACH)	Skilled nursing facility (SNF)	Ventilator- capable skilled nursing facility (vSNF)
C. auris	39%	42%	1%	18%
CRE	66%	14%	2%	19%
CP-CRPA*	11%	0%	0%	89%
CP-CRAB*	43%	27%	3%	27%

*Not reportable in IL

- At the last roundtable, we discussed MDRO epidemiology in Chicago
- Prevalence/reporting of MDROs varies by location type:

Percentage of Chicago MDRO cases reported to XDRO by organism and reporting setting, 2022.

MDRO	Acute care hospital (ACH)	Long-term acute care hospital (LTACH)	Skilled nursing facility (SNF)	Ventilator- capable skilled nursing facility (vSNF)
C. auris	39%	42%	1%	18%
CRE	66%	14%	2%	19%
CP-CRPA*	11%	0%	0%	89%
CP-CRAB*	43%	27%	3%	27%

*Not reportable in IL

- At the last roundtable, we discussed MDRO epidemiology in Chicago
- Prevalence/reporting of MDROs varies by location type:

Candida auris vSNF & LTACH point prevalence data by facility, 2017-2022



Compared to 0-1% in ACH ICUs

- At the last roundtable, we discussed MDRO epidemiology in Chicago
- Prevalence/reporting of MDROs varies by location type:

Candida auris vSNF & LTACH point prevalence data by facility, 2017-2022



Compared to 0-1% in ACH ICUs

★ Tier Approaches to MDRO Response

Tier 1

• Organisms for which no treatment options exist or have never or only rarely been detected in the U.S.

Tier 2

• Organisms not commonly detected in a geographic area

Tier 3

• Organisms that are known threats in a geographic area but not endemic

Table 1: Summary of Response Recommendations for MDRO Containment by Tier

Description	Tier 1 Resistance mechanisms never or very rarely identified in the United States; pan-resistant organisms with the potential for wider spread in a region	Tier 2 Mechanisms and organisms not regularly found in a region	Tier 3 Mechanisms and organisms regularly found in a region but not endemic
Healthcare Investigation ¹			
Review the patient's healthcare exposures prior to and after the positive culture	Always	Always	Always
Contact Investigation ¹			
Screening of healthcare roommates	Always	Always	Always
Broader screening of healthcare contacts ²	Always ³	Sometimes⁴	Sometimes
Prospective lab surveillance ^s	Always	Always	Always
Retrospective lab surveillance6	Always	Always	Sometimes
Household contact screening	Sometimes	Rarely	Rarely
Environmental sampling	Sometimes	Rarely	Rarely
Healthcare personnel screening	Sometimes	Rarely	Rarely
Evaluate potential spread to healthcare facilities that regularly share patients with the index healthcare facility?	Sometimes	Sometimes	Rarely
Infection Control Measures			
Prompt notification of healthcare providers and patient and implementation of appropriate transmission-based precautions	Always	Always	Always
Clear communication of patient status with transferring facilities	Always	Always	Always
On-site infection control assessment with observations of practice, such as Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity (ELC) Infection Control Assessment and Response (ICAR)	Always	Always	Sometimes

¹ For Tier 1 and 2 organisms/mechanisms, healthcare exposures and healthcare contacts over the preceding 30 days should be investigated unless information is available about the time the organism was most likely acquired. This includes any healthcare facility where the patient had an overnight stay during that time period. In some investigations, outpatient facilities and emergency departments might also be included. For Tier 3 organisms, investigation of healthcare exposures and healthcare contacts is generally limited to the current and sometimes prior admission.

² This may include targeted screening of contacts at highest risk for acquisition and/or unit point prevalence surveys.

³ If the MDRO is a novel organism for which data on the frequency and modes of transmission are not known, or if the index patient was not on Contact Precautions during their entire stay in a healthcare facility, then additional screening (beyond roommates) is recommended. Broader screening, including patients on the same ward as the index patient and/or patients that shared healthcare personnel, might be particularly important for detecting novel MDROs when data on the frequency and modes of transmission are lacking.

⁴ If the index patient was not on Contact Precautions during their entire stay in a healthcare facility, then broader screening (beyond roommates) is recommended. Screening can initially be limited to the contacts at highest risk for acquisition, such as those still admitted who overlapped on the same ward as the index patient and who have a risk factor for MDRO acquisition (e.g., bedbound, high levels of care, receipt of antibiotics, or mechanical ventilation). Alternatively, facilities may choose to screen entire units using point prevalence surveys.

⁵ Prospective surveillance of clinical cultures should be conducted for three months after the last identified case.

⁶ Conduct a laboratory lookback covering at least 6 months prior to identification of index case.

⁷ A public health investigation should also be initiated at healthcare facilities known to regularly share patients with healthcare facilities where transmission has occurred, such as post-acute care facilities. At a minimum, this should include notification of the facility and a request to retrospectively and prospectively evaluate clinical cultures for the phenotype of interest. This could also include admission screening of patients at the facility (e.g., transfers from the index facility) and/or point prevalence surveys of high-risk patients or units.

https://www.cdc.gov/hai/pdfs/c ontainment/Health-Response-Contain-MDRO-H.pdf

Tiers are subject to change based on epidemiologic trends

Proposed Chicago MDRO Tiers

Tier 1

TBD based on CDC national data

Proposed Chicago MDRO Tiers

Tier 1
TBD based on CDC national data
Tier 2
CP-CRAB non-OXA mechanism
CP-CRPA with mechanism
C. auris in non-vSNF/LTACH healthcare setting or other congregate setting
C. auris cluster* in ACH
CP-CRE – VIM, IMP, OXA-48
CP-CRE NDM in non-vSNF/LTACH healthcare setting or other congregate setting

CP-CRE NDM cluster* in ACH

Cluster of Pan-R organisms (e.g., *Elizabethkingia*)

*Cluster definitions still need to be determined

Proposed Chicago MDRO Tiers

Tier 1
TBD based on CDC national data
Tier 2
CP-CRAB non-OXA mechanism
CP-CRPA with mechanism
C. auris in non-vSNF/LTACH healthcare setting or other congregate setting
C. auris cluster* in ACH
CP-CRE – VIM, IMP, OXA-48
CP-CRE NDM in non-vSNF/LTACH healthcare setting or other congregate setting
CP-CRE NDM cluster* in ACH
Cluster of Pan-R organisms (e.g., Elizabethkingia)

Tier 3

CP-CRE NDM: single cases in ACH, or clusters* in vSNF/LTACH

CP-CRAB (OXA or unknown mechanism) cluster*

• Example of ACH patient transfer network – academic center



Not all facilities are pictured

*Out of jurisdiction (i.e., Chicago)

• Example 2 of ACH patient transfer network – community hospital



• Example of LTACH network



• Example of SNF patient transfer network





Patient transfer networks are complicated and allow for the spread of MDROs across different settings and jurisdictions



- Query XDRO Registry on all new admissions
- To set up auto alerts please contact XDRO help desk
 For IDPH log-in help, call 217-524-3648 or 312-814-3648
 For XDRO registry questions, email <u>DPH.XDROregistry@Illinois.gov</u>

					Home (Citations Help	Go Back Logou
				Search Pat	tient		
* La	st name	* Date of birth		First name	Query		
owing r	esults for Ander	son, Tonya DOB 7/25/1973		0	College Date	•• •	F
		Date of Birth	55N	Organism	Culture Date	Last Transaction	Facility
D 538	Name			Acinetobacter baumannii	02/06/2023	submitted,02/14/2023	Chicago Departm
D 538 Discla	aimer: A mate	h on name and date o pai	of birth tient of	Acinetobacter baumannii only may not be 100% ac r by contacting the facility nt of Public Health is enter	02/06/2023 ccurate. We recor that entered the	submitted,02/14/2023 mmend that you verify X result.	Chicago Departm
Discla Note: / can wh	As of January be identified	ch on name and date o pai r 2017, the Illinois Der through the above set n single rooms. More	of birth tient of partme arch qu inform	Acinetobacter baumannii only may not be 100% ar r by contacting the facility nt of Public Health is enter jery. Patients with C. auris ation is available on CDC's	02/06/2023 ccurate. We recor that entered the ring Candida auri should be placed Questions and An	submitted,02/14/2023 mmend that you verify X result. s cases into the XDRO m d on standard and conta- swers and Interim Recomm	Chicago Departm CDRO status with the egistry; such patients ct precautions and, <u>mendations</u> pages.
Discla Discla Note: / can wh As of /	aimer: A mate As of January be identified en possible, i April 2017, II	ch on name and date of pai r 2017, the Illinois Deg through the above set n single rooms. More DPH is entering carbag	of birth tient of partme arch qu inform penema	Acinetobacter baumannii only may not be 100% ar r by contacting the facility nt of Public Health is enter yery. Patients with C. auris ation is available on CDC's ase-producing Pseudomon is available on <u>CDC's</u>	02/06/2023 ccurate. We recor that entered the ring Candida auri should be placed Questions and Ans as aeruginosa cas website.	submitted,02/14/2023 mmend that you verify X result. s cases into the XDRO rd d on standard and conta swers and Interim Recom ses into the XDRO regist	Chicago Departm (DRO status with the egistry; such patients ct precautions and, <u>mendations</u> pages. try. More information

- If patient is found in XDRO registry, initiate contact precautions and be sure to use appropriate cleaners/disinfectants
- If a patient has a positive culture for MDRO, it is important to add them to the XDRO registry
 - Doing so ensures that patient can easily be identified as having previous colonization and expedites placing them on contact precautions and reduces chance of transmission
- When transferring a patient colonized with a MDRO please notify the receiving facility



CDPH IP Roundtable Meeting, February 24, 2022

Jacqueline Maniscalco, MPH, BSN, RN

Infection Preventionist

Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Chicago, IL

2/27/2023



Illinois is a hotspot for *C. auris* and we know it is very prevalent in skilled nursing, nursing home or long-term care

We want to identify the right patients and have the right precautions in place to reduce spread



Candida auris (C. auris) is an emerging multidrug-resistant yeast (a type of fungus). It can cause severe infections and spreads easily between hospitalized patients and nursing home residents.

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

- C. auris, first identified in 2009 in Asia, has quickly become a cause of severe infections around the world.
- C. auris is a concerning drug-resistant fungus:
 - Often multidrug-resistant, with some strains (types) resistant to all three available classes of antifungals
 - Can cause outbreaks in healthcare facilities
 - Some common healthcare disinfectants are less effective at eliminating it
 - Can be carried on patients' skin without causing infection, allowing spread to others

Data represents U.S. cases only. Isolates are pure samples of a germ.



U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CASES OVER TIME

C. auris began spreading in the United States in 2015. Reported cases increased 318% in 2018 when compared to the average number of cases reported in 2015 to 2017.





2/27/2023

CDC Infection Prevention and Control for Candida auris

Summary

- Screening
 - Consider screening patients at high risk of *C. auris*, including
 - Close healthcare contacts of patients with newly identified *C. auris*
 - At a minimum, consider screening patients who require higher levels of care (e.g., mechanical ventilation) and who overlapped on the ward or unit with the index patient for 3 or more days, as these patients are at high risk of colonization
 - Patients who had an overnight stay in a healthcare facility outside the US in the last year







^{2/27/2023}

edicine*

Admission Required Documentation

Resurgence of *Candida auris* in Skilled Nursing, Acute Rehab and Long Term Acute Care Facilities is driving the need for screening of patients admitted from these facilities.

• *C. auris* screening has been added into the Admission Navigator as required documentation for patients 18 and older.



• An answer of yes to the first question regarding SNF, Rehab or LTAC, will cascade a second question regarding having a tracheostomy with a correlating BPA.



BPAs Trigger the Screening Orders

• BPA for a patient with a trach or who is on a vent:



• BPA for a patient who does not have a trach or is not on a vent:

	1		
	C. auris screen lab tests, as ind orders now.	ing indicates this patient needs licated below. Please place	
Order	Do Not Order	Candida auris Screen, Axilla/Groin	
Order	Do Not Order	nares 🗸 Candida auris Screen, Nares	
cknowledge Rea	ison		
Remind me later	lot direct caregiver		

For assistance in swabbing for Endotracheal Aspirate, please contact the Respiratory Therapist for assistance.



Specimen Collection Swabbing Guidance Added

• Directions on how to perform the specimen collection properly will display for each required specimen source when the Print Label button is selected.





The Appropriate Response to a Positive C. auris Result

• If the result for *C. auris* is a Positive status, a mismatch icon will display on the My Patient List.

Nmit, Himwsr	68 y.o. / M	Candida auris 🔶
	Nmit, Himwsr	Nmit, Himwsr 68 y.o. / M

• The required isolation type for *C. auris* is Contact Plus.



Note: Contact Plus Isolation should not be ordered until Positive Status is resulted.



Subsequent Admissions and Transfers Between NM Facilities

• Patients who have been screened for *C. auris* but transfer between NM campuses with a test in process will not need to be rescreened at the receiving NM facility.

CRITICAL STEP: When patients have a positive *Candida auris* resulted, the isolation flag will remain at the patient level on the chart. Contact Plus Isolation would be initiated upon admission. The patient with the positive *Candida auris* history would not need re-screening questions or culture testing on subsequent admissions.





Candida auris Screening – Basics

Things to consider when that screening is missed:

- Patient satisfaction as some patients really may not like the extra swabbing
- Ring surveillance caused from a patient who likely had this organism on admission is just another thing for nursing to do
- Why all this work if our patients are colonized? Important to note patient risk factors that can lead to infection (associated with high morbidity and mortality) such as indwelling medical devices, surgery, immunosuppression, etc.



Thank you Questions?





Appendix

Candida auris Screening SBAR



SITUATION	Resurgence of <i>Candida auris</i> in skilled nursing, acute rehab and long term acute care facilities is driving the need for screening of patients admitted from these facilities. Nosocomial cases have been identified in facilities, including Northwestern Memorial Hospital.
BACKGROUND	Patients colonized with <i>C. auris</i> can transmit <i>C. auris</i> to other patients within healthcare facilities and may be at risk for invasive <i>C. auris</i> infections.
ASSESSMENT	Screening this patient population at the time of admit will provide timely isolation requirements and mitigation of transmission.
RECOMMENDATION	A Best Practice Alert (BPA) screening order will trigger for patients 18 or older who have recently been admitted to a skilled nursing facility, long term acute care hospital or acute rehab hospital in the past 6 months.
	If a patient qualifies for screening, it is important to collect cultures to identify colonized patients. The screening order will indicate lab collections for axilla/groin and nares (& endotracheal aspirate if patient has a trach). Swabbing guidance will display for each required specimen source.
	Contact Plus Precautions should not be ordered until positive status is resulted.
	C. auris screening has been added into the Admission Navigator as required documentation for patients 18 and older. Please share with staff, as needed.



2/27/2023



Invasive group A Streptococcal case burden, Fall/Winter 2022

Karrie-Ann Toews, MPH

CDC Career Epidemiology Field Officer

K Group A Streptococcus and disease

- Typically found on throat and skin- persons may carry GAS in their throat and not become ill (colonized, not infected)
- Spread by discharge from nose and throat of colonized or infected persons (respiratory droplet transmission) or contact with infected wounds and sores



***** Case definition of Invasive group A Streptococcal disease

• Isolation of GAS from any sterile site

 Blood, CSF, pleural fluid, pericardial fluid, bone, joint fluid, lymph node, brain, heart, liver, spleen, vitreous fluid, kidney, pancreas, ovary, prostate gland, muscle or tissue biopsy that is surgically obtained

OR

 Isolation of GAS from any of the above or a non-sterile site <u>when accompanied by toxic shock</u> or <u>necrotizing fasciitis</u>



airways

Deep within the body

***** Recent increases in pediatric case burden

- Increased rates of iGAS and scarlet fever in Ireland, France, Netherlands, North Ireland, Sweden and UK since fall
- Concerns about antibiotic supply for treatment in Scotland (media reports)
- WHO: increase reported in children 1-10 years following lower period of incidence in 2020 and 2021
 - Increases likely reflect and early increase in circulation of GAS following period of reduced incidence during pandemic
 - Reported cases not caused by newly circulating emm type
 - Diverse range of emm types: emm 1 (30%), emm 12 (17%), emm 89 (7%), emm 108 (4%) and emm 33 (4%)
 - No reports of increased antibiotic resistance
- Reports of increased GAS infection in Australia, including 2 pediatric deaths
 - Concern over antibiotic supply
- Increased rates and 2 pediatric iGAS deaths in CO and MI
- Higher rates being reporting by children's hospitals in AZ, TX, WV and WA
- CDC monitoring possible increase in iGAS nationally

k Invasive group A strep cases, Chicago, 2016-2022



UK iGAS pediatric deaths, Sept- Dec 2022 ⁴⁵

\bigstar Seasonality of disease is similar between adults and children



≤ 18 years

> 18 years

Chicago not experiencing increase in pediatric iGAS

Year	Total cases	Pediatric cases	Sept-Dec (%)	Adult cases	Sept-Dec (%)
2016	103	11	3 (27)	92	27 (29)
2017	139	11	1 (9)	128	25 (20)
2018	105	16	2 (13)	89	20 (22)
2019	124	12	4 (33)	112	38 (34)
2020	115	5	0 (0)	110	28 (25)
2021	85	2	0 (0)	83	25 (30)
2022*	88	3	0 (0)	85	29 (34)

* INEDSS as of 1/13/2023

\mathbf{I} \mathbf{I} IL is experiencing an increase in pediatric iGAS

Year	Total cases	Pediatric cases	Sept-Dec (%)	Adult cases	Sept-Dec (%)
2016	447	38	7 (18)	409	114 (28)
2017	457	42	6 (14)	415	98 (24)
2018	490	58	11 (19)	432	112 (26)
2019	490	43	11 (26)	447	139 (31)
2020	405	25	3 (12)	380	77 (20)
2021	258	6	2 (33)	252	80 (32)
2022*	374	20	14 (70)	354	138 (39)

* INEDSS as of 1/13/2023

k Invasive group A strep cases, Chicago, 2016-2022



UK iGAS pediatric deaths, Sept- Dec 2022 ⁴⁹

Confirmed cases included (N=28 w/onset after October 1, 2022)

- Streptococcal disease invasive Group A (n=27)
- Streptococcal disease invasive Group A with Necrotizing Fasciitis (n=0)
- Streptococcal Toxic Shock Syndrome (n=1)
- Streptococcal Toxic Shock Syndrome with Necrotizing Fasciitis (n=0)



Age group	Case count (%)
0-17	0 (0)
18-39	3 (11)
40-64	15 (53)
65+	10 (35)
Total	28 (100)
Race	
Black	13 (46)
White	12 (43)
Other/Missing	3 (11)

Ethnicity	
Non Hispanic	25 (89)
Hispanic	2 (7)
Other/Missing	1 (4)
Sex	
Male	18 (64)
Female	10 (36)

Kert Kert Kerter And Wounds (Kerter State and Wounds States) to the set of th

	Case count (%)	
IVDU/polysubstance drug use*	8 (29)	
 Wounds* Drains from chronic GSW, diabetic ulcers, chronic venous stasis 	5 (18)	
SNF resident**	2 (7)	Not mutual
Person experiencing homelessness*	2 (7)	
Post-surgery/post-partum	0 (0)	

ly exclusive

* Extracted from epi and reporter comments ** Two cases associated with SNFs:

\star Assisting with iGAS epidemiology and risk factors

Helpful reporter comments in INEDSS

XXX undomiciled with h/o IVDU, CHF with normal EF, MRSA bacteremia (c/b L CFA mycotic aneurysm, hx possible mitral endocarditis, hx paraspinal abscess, hx L4-5 septic arthritis), left common femoral artery aneurysm (status post excision and femoral to SFA bypass graft) on Eliquis, LLE DVT, known persistent occlusion of L CFA with distal reconstitution, and multiple recent admissions for chronic wounds, now presenting with L groin abscess over previous vascular surgery site.



	Case count (%)
Hospitalization	25 (89)
Death*	3 (11)
Amputation*	1 (4)
Debridement*	1 (4)

Deaths: Two SNF residents

Length of stay: Median: 5 days Range: 1-11 days*

* Potential for missing data entry esp. discharge date (n=23) and possibly death due to limited follow-up post investigation

Shelter locations in Chicago vs iGAS cases after 10/1/2022

- iGAS case residence (n=28)
- Shelter (n=69)



k Reporting Invasive group A Streptococcal disease

- Should be reported to public health within <u>24 hours</u> of identification
- Ideally, should be reported via INEDSS
 - If INEDSS unavailable, please call **312-746-7425** to report
 - Someone will take your contact information and will call back to collect case information

***** Optimizing iGAS Public Health Response

- Notice of any iGAS case associated with a facility (overnight dwelling) that is not a
 private residence
 - Healthcare -> Engage healthcare colleagues for facility response and prevention guidance
 - Shelter or any indication of being undomiciled
 - In-house drug treatment

Engage special populations unit for facility response

- Send prevention guidance to facility
- Engage support with primary care providers already providing services

Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations

Infection	Type of Precaution	Duration of Precaution	Comments
Streptococcal disease (group A <i>Streptococcus</i>) Skin, wound, or burn Major	Contact+ Droplet + Standard	Until 24 hours after initiation of effective therapy	Until drainage stops or can be contained by dressing
Streptococcal disease (group A <i>Streptococcus</i>) Pharyngitis in infants and young children	Droplet + Standard	Until 24 hours after initiation of effective therapy	Until drainage stops or can be contained by dressing
Streptococcal disease (group A <i>Streptococcus</i>) Pneumonia	Droplet + Standard	Until 24 hours after initiation of effective therapy	
Streptococcal disease (group A <i>Streptococcus</i>) Scarlet fever in infants and young children	Droplet + Standard	Until 24 hours after initiation of effective therapy	
Streptococcal disease (group A <i>Streptococcus</i>) Serious invasive disease	Droplet + Standard	Until 24 hours after initiation of effective therapy	Outbreaks of serious invasive disease have occurred secondary to transmission among patients and healthcare personnel [162, 972, 1096-1098]. Contact Precautions for draining wound as above; follow recommendations for antimicrobial prophylaxis in selected conditions [160].

Precautions | Appendix A | Isolation Precautions | Guidelines Library | Infection Control | CDC



Thank You!

karrie-ann.toews@cityofchicago.org



Chicago.gov/Health



HealthyChicago@cityofchicago.org



@ChicagoPublicHealth



@ChiPublicHealth

***** Ongoing outbreak of significance

- Extensively Drug-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa Associated with Artificial Tears
 - VIM-GES-carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (CRPA)
 - EzriCare or Delsam Pharma's Artificial Tears
- As of February 21, 2023, 58 patients in 13 states (1 in IL) have been identified
 - Thirty-five patients were linked to 4 healthcare facility clusters
 - One person has died and there have been 5 reports of vision loss
- To report suspected case(s) in Chicago residents (e.g., ocular infection due to CRPA with specimen collection dates since May 1, 2022), please call 312-744-1100. For questions, please email <u>doyoung.kim@cityofchicago.org</u>
- Ask your clinical laboratories to save these isolates for further characterization at public health laboratories
- Outbreak information: <u>CDC</u> and <u>Chicago HAN</u>

🗰 What do I do if I have a cluster at my facility?

- Cluster definitions vary by pathogen. When in doubt call us!
- For any cluster reporting or guidance please call 312-744-1100 AND email <u>cdphhaiar@cityofchicago.org</u>
- For reporting COVID-19 clusters: https://redcap.dph.illinois.gov/surveys/?s=FR7MAJAY84

Challenges for Facilities and Public Health



- Identification of clusters
- When to report to CDPH
- How to report to CDPH
- What happens after IP reports
- EMR not able to capture important information:
 - Previous healthcare encounters
 - Unknown patient location/residence

。?

- Space is limited. Our training room can accommodate up to 40 participant
- If interested in attending, email Kim at: <u>Kimberly.Goitia@CityofChicago.org</u>
- Bring your own laptop (this is a hands-on training)
- Upcoming training dates:
 - February 28th: XDRO reporting
 - March 21-23rd: no on-site CDPH training but recommend attending NHSN Annual Training Webinar <u>https://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/training/annualtraining.html</u>
 - April 25th : NHSN surveillance and reporting Q&A



Thank you for participating! Next Roundtable: **3/31/2023**





Open Forum for Questions and Comments

- Our general number: 312-744-1100
- cdphhaiar@cityofchicago.org

